feat: zeroclaw agentic agency architecture — agents, skills, Rust crates
- 18 agent specs across Software, Support, Marketing, Cross-cutting (orchestrator + 7 software + 5 support + 3 cross-cutting + leads-finder) - 8 reusable skills (handoff, pr-review, dokploy-deploy, campaign-structure, content-calendar, ticket-triage, license-lifecycle, invoice-draft) - 3 JSON schemas: handoff, deliverable, approval - Policies: autonomy levels, tool risk classification, compliance (DSGVO/GoBD/UWG) - routing.toml: model tiers T1/T2/T3 + provider config (PII gating) - Rust workspace (5 crates, all compile + 16 tests pass): - aos-mcp: tool registry + risk tagging - aos-policy: autonomy levels, budget enforcement, approval requests - aos-license: ed25519 license issue/verify (real crypto + CLI binary) - aos-ledger: integer-cents money math, gapless numbering, VAT, audit chain - aos-sync: frontmatter validator (18/18 specs pass), CLI binary - CLAUDE.md entry point with architecture overview + roadmap
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
d18c463ffd
commit
136379c666
60 files changed
+4776
No files matched your search
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
//! Tool registry + risk classification.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Every tool exposed to agents carries a `Risk` tag. The `aos-policy` crate
|
||||
//! enforces that an agent's tier (and autonomy level) permits the call. See
|
||||
//! `policies/tool-risk.md` for the human-readable classification.
|
||||
|
||||
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Risk classification for an MCP tool. Drives approval gating.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// - `Low`: read-only, idempotent, no external side effects. Any tier.
|
||||
/// - `Medium`: internal reversible writes, or reads touching PII/financials.
|
||||
/// T1/T2 direct; T3 needs a reviewer pass.
|
||||
/// - `High`: irreversible, external, or money-moving. **Always** produces an
|
||||
/// `ApprovalRequest` regardless of tier. Never auto-executed.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
|
||||
pub enum Risk {
|
||||
Low,
|
||||
Medium,
|
||||
High,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Specification of a tool exposed via the MCP server.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
pub struct ToolSpec {
|
||||
/// Dotted name, e.g. `aos-mcp:read_task`, `ads:spend`.
|
||||
pub name: String,
|
||||
pub risk: Risk,
|
||||
pub description: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Returns the registered tool specs.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// TODO: populate from a manifest file or a proc-macro inventory. For now
|
||||
/// this is an empty registry — the structure is what the policy crate
|
||||
/// consumes.
|
||||
pub fn list_tools() -> Vec<ToolSpec> {
|
||||
Vec::new()
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user